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IV 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78A-3-102G). Pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court erred in holding that NYA did not violate the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it exercised its discretion under the REPC to 
extend the closing date indefinitely in disregard of Defendants' justified expectations and 
~ the agreed common purpose of the contract. The Court reviews the district court's 
"interpretation of a contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 
UT 50, 116, 84 P.3d 1134. This issue was preserved in the Harrisons' motion for 
vi:) 
.,;jj) 
summary judgment filed on November 8, 201 l(R. 110-80), and reply thereto (R. 229-65), 
and in their motion to reconsider filed on January 22, 2013 (R. 543-81 ), and reply thereto 
(R. 662-71 ). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the district court erred in holding that the Harrisons breached 
the REPC by refusing NY A's tender of payment which was conditioned on Defendants' 
acceptance ofNYA's disputed interpretation of the REPC, including acceptance of terms 
not found in the REPC itself. The Court reviews the district court's "interpretation of a 
contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50, 116. The Court also 
reviews the district court's interpretation of a statute for correctness. Gillmor v. Summit 
vii Cnty., 2010 UT 69, 1 16, 246 P.3d 102. This issue was preserved in the Harrisons' 
opposition to NY A's partial motion for summary judgment, filed February 24, 2012 (R. 
1 
325-51), and in their motion to reconsider filed on January 22, 2013 (R. 543-81), and 
reply thereto (R. 662-71 ). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the district court erred in holding that NY A was not required to 
perform its obligations under the REPC within a reasonable time. The Court reviews the 
district court's "interpretation of a contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co., 
2003 UT 50, ,I 16. This issue was preserved in the Harrisons' motion for summary 
judgment filed on November 8, 2011 (R. 110-80), and reply thereto (R.229-65), and in its 
opposition to NYA's motion for summary judgment, filed February 24, 2012 (R. 325-51). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the district court erred in holding that NY A did not breach the 
REPC as a matter of law by failing to make unconditional Extension Payments and 
failing to close on the Property. The Court reviews the district court's "interpretation of a 
contract" for "correctness." Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50, ,I 16. This issue was 
preserved in the Harrisons' motion for summary judgment filed on November 8,201 l(R. 
110-80), and reply thereto (R. 229-65), and in their motion to reconsider filed on January 
22, 2013 (R. 543-81 ), and reply thereto. (R. 662-71 ). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-802. Tender - Offer in writing sufficient - Objection -
Must be specific or waived. 
(1) An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument 
or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production 
and tender of the money, instrument, or property. 
(2) The person to whom a tender is made shall, at the time, specify any objection to the 
money, instrument, or property, or it is considered waived. 
(3) If the objection is to the amount of money, the terms of the instrument or the amount 
or kind of property, the person shall specify the amounts, terms, or kind which is 
2 
required, or be precluded from objection afterwards. 
~ 
(A copy of the statute is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 1.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This suit arises out of a dispute over the interpretation of a real estate purchase 
contract. The Harrisons, an elderly couple seeking money to fund their retirement, own 
20.27 acres of real property located at approximately 950 West 700 South in the city of 
Springville, Utah County, Utah (the "Property"). 1 Plaintiff, New York Ave., LLC 
("NY A"), a real estate investor with hopes to develop the Property, and the Harrisons 
entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") in November 2006. The REPC 
permitted NYA to exercise its "discretion" to extend the closing date from the agreed 
upon October 31, 2007, for thirty days at a time by paying $6,250 in interest-free 
payments toward the purchase price to the Harrisons each month it extended ("Extension 
Payments"). 
Unhappy with market conditions and the development potential of the Property, 
NY A sought to exercise its discretion under the REPC to convert the purchase contract 
:.:j) into an indefinite-term option contract or interest-free seller-financed purchase. After 
delaying its purchase of the property for nearly two years beyond the original closing date 
and doing nothing to develop the Property within the previous year, NY A balked when 
the Harrisons requested that they purchase the Property within a reasonable time, set a 
date that they believed was reasonable, and invited a discussion with NY A about when a 
1 During the pendency of this case, Mrs. Harrison passed away. 
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reasonable time might be. NY A maintained that it had no obligation to purchase the 
Property within a reasonable time, either under the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing or the common-law rule that contracts be performed within a reasonable time. 
After the commencement of this action, NY A purported to make the August 2009 
Extension Payment (the "Disputed Extension Payment") on the condition that the 
Harrisons accept NY A's interpretation of the contract. This was an inappropriate use of 
the tender rule to attempt to bully the Harrisons into giving up their rights under the 
REPC. After the Harrisons returned the Disputed Extension Payment and expressed a 
continued willingness to accept unconditional tender, NY A did not withdraw its 
conditions and did not tender any additional Extension Payments thereafter. 
On summary judgment, the district court ruled that the Harrisons did not 
anticipatorily breach the REPC by requesting that NYA close on the Property within a 
reasonable time. The district court further ruled that NY A was not required to perform 
under the REPC within a reasonable amount of time, that NY A did not violate the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by extending the closing indefinitely or by 
making the Disputed Extension Payment conditioned on the Harrisons accepting its 
interpretation of the REPC, and that the Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing the 
Disputed Extension Payment, which the district court characterized as "valid tender." 
The district court denied the Harrisons motion to reconsider this ruling. 2 After another 
2 Copies of the Ruling and Order are attached to the Addendum respectively as 
Exhibits 2 and 3. 
4 
round of summary judgment briefing on damages, which the Harrisons appealed in part 
but are not pursuing, the district court entered final judgment against the Harrisons, 
which it modified in its ruling on NY A's subsequent Rule 60(b) motion. This appeal 
~ followed. 
A. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Parties Enter Into the Real Estate Purchase Contract and 
Addenda 
1. The Harrisons own 20.27 acres of real property located at approximately 
950 West 700 South in the city of Springville, Utah County, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 
40, if 7.) 
2. On November 10, 2006, NY A and the Harrisons entered into a Real Estate 
~ Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC") to purchase the Property. (R. 40, ,r 8; Real Estate 
Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"), attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 4.) 
3. NY A's purchase of the Property was conditioned on its approval of a 
physical condition inspection of the Property, a survey, and approval of laws, ordinances, 
regulations, and deed restrictions. (R. 29, ,r 8; REPC ,r 8.) In order to object to the 
Property and modify the REPC on these grounds, NY A was required to notify the 
Harrisons of its objections within 90 days of November 22, 2006. (R. 24, ,r 11; 
;JJ) Addendum No. 1 to Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC Addendum No. 1") ,r 11, 
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 5.) 
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4. After the Due Diligence Deadline, the earnest money was dispersed to the 
Harrisons and became "non-refundable thereafter if Buyer fails to close for any reason." 
(R. 24, ,r 9; REPC Addendum No. 1 19.) 
5. Addendum No. 1 set settlement for 180 days from the date of the fully 
executed contract and permitted NY A to pay $12,500 per month in "non-refundable 
earnest money" to extend the contract beyond that date. (R. 24,113, 10; REPC 
Addendum No. 1 ,r,r 3, 10.) 
6. On or about November 22, 2006, the parties entered into a second 
addendum modifying the earlier agreement ("Addendum No. 2"). (R. 39, ,r 15; 
Addendum No. 2 to Real Estate Purchase Contact ("REPC Addendum No. 2") ,r 15, 
attached to the addendum as Exhibit 6.) This addendum, among other things, extended 
closing to October 31, 2007, reduced the Extension Payments to $6,250 per month, and 
required the Harrisons to include 20.27 water shares with the purchase. (R. 21, ,r,r 1-5; 
REPC Addendum No. 2 ,r,r 1-5.) 
7. Between the contract date and closing, the Harrisons agreed that they would 
not change the leases, alter or improve the property, or financially encumber the property. 
(R. 28, ,r 12; REPC ,r 12.) The Harrisons were also required to pay taxes and other 
carrying costs during the time the Property was under contract. (R. 28, ,r 10.1; REPC 
110.1.) 
8. The REPC, addenda, exhibits, and seller's disclosures constitute the 
"entire" contract between the parties and can only be changed "by written agreement of 
the parties." (R. 28, ,r 14; REPC ,r 14.) 
6 
9. Time is of the essence in performance of obligations under the REPC. (R. 
27, ,r 21; REPC ,r 21.) 
B. NYA Delays Closing on the Property for Nearly Two Years 
IO. About two months after the parties entered into the REPC, on January 30, 
2007, NY A owner Steven Kelly wrote a letter to the Harri sons informing of them of a 
problem connecting the Property to the Springville sewer system. He further stated 
(R. 151-52.) 
It looks like I won't be able to develop the property until mid-2008 
at the earliest. However, I like the property and want to continue the 
contract as it is currently written .... On October 31st I will start 
making the monthly payments to you that we agreed upon until I 
close on the property, which will be when the sewer trunk line is 
installed and I can get the necessary approvals from the city to 
develop. 
11. The information contained in the January 30, 2007 letter, which was sent 
nearly two months after the parties entered into the REPC, was never added to the REPC 
...iJ or agreed to by the Harrisons. (See generally REPC.) 
12. On September 19, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons updating 
them on his progress in developing the Property. Specifically, he informed them that he 
had found a way to work around the problem with connecting to the Springville sewer 
system. He further stated, "I will be paying the extension fees as outlined in the purchase 
contract until I close. It slwuldn't be too far into the future." (R. 149-50. (emphasis 
added.)) 
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13. In early 2008, Mr. Kelly unsuccessfully attempted to get approval from 
Springville City to work around the sewer trunk line issue. (R. 141.) Mr. Kelly did not 
attempt to receive sewer approval thereafter. (R. 137, 127.) 
14. In April 2008, Mr. Kelly disclosed to his site engineer Brian Gabler that 
"[W]e are holding off pursuing this at the current time." (R. 126.) 
15. On March 5, 2009, frustrated with NYA's lack of progress toward 
purchasing the Property, the Harrisons requested NY A close on the property no later than 
August 5, 2009, nearly two years after the original closing deadline, on the grounds that 
under Utah common law, agreements that do not specify a time for performance must be 
performed within a reasonable amount of time, and that NY A's failure to close violated 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 124-25 (a copy of the Letter from S. 
Newman to K. Kelly, dated March 5, 2009 ("March 5 Letter") is attached to the 
addendum as Exhibit 7). ); see also Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P .2d 852, 85 8 
(Utah 1998). The Harrisons invited NY A to propose "a reasonable settlement deadline." 
(R. 124-25; March 5 Letter.) 
16. The district court specifically held that the March 5 Letter and the 
Harrisons' legal position that NY A was required to perform in a reasonable time was not 
an anticipatory breach of the REPC, and this ruling has not been appealed. (R. 3 91.) 
C. The Parties Commence Litigation 
17. On June 22, 2009, NYA brought claims against the Harrisons for 
rescission, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment. (R. 21-41.) The Harrisons 
8 
counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing on the grounds that NYA failed to close within a reasonable time. (R. 42-58.) 
18. NY A continued to make unconditional Extension Payments under the 
~ REPC in June and July 2009, which the Harrisons accepted. The Harrisons did not sell or 
attempt to sell the Property to any other purchaser, and therefore complied with their 
obligation under the REPC. 
19. Two months after litigation commenced, on August 31, 2009, NY A 
purported to make an Extension Payment (the "Disputed Extension Payment"). The 
Disputed Extension Payment was accompanied by a three-page letter from NY A's 
counsel outlining NY A's interpretation of the REPC (the "August 31 Letter"). (R. 116-
18 ( a copy of the Letter from K. Kelly to M. Gay lord et al., dated August 31, 2009 
("August 31 Letter") is attached to the addendum as Exhibit 8).) It made acceptance of 
the Disputed Extension Payment contingent on the Harrisons' acceptance ofNYA's 
interpretation as set forth in the Amended Complaint. (R. 116-18; August 31 Letter.) 
20. In the August 3 1 Letter, NY A set forth its understanding of the terms of the 
REPC as follows: 
(a) The purchase price for the property was based on the 
assumption that it could be developed as single family residential 
that would maximize the development potential of the land based on 
the zoning laws in place that govern the subject property. With the 
lack of sewer capabilities, and through further information garnered 
through the development process that showed insufficient storm 
drainage capacity, the property could not (at the time) be developed 
to its maximum potential. 
(b) The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could 
be developed to its maximum potential was crucial to my clients. 
9 
Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a credit towards the 
purchase price" of the property as stated in the REPC and was in no 
way to be considered "rent" or an interest payment. 
( c) The closing deadline was being extended and the Extension 
Payment reduced in part to account for the fact that, since the sewer 
was not readily available, it might be some time before the property 
could be developed as anticipated. 
(d) The REPC could be extended, at [NYA's] discretion as stated 
in the REPC, to allow for the property to be developed to its full 
potential. This includes, but is not limited to: sewer line extension 
installed to the property, storm drainage readily available, and 
property being economically feasible to develop under zoning 
ordinance of Springville City and existing market conditions. 
(R. 116-17; August 31 Letter at 2-3.) 
21. The August 31 Letter concluded: 
By negotiating this $6,250 check, you are agreeing with my client 
that it is entitled under the REPC to make these payments in order to 
postpone closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC 
until it is economically feasible to move forward with a residential 
development of the property as discussed above, including in 
paragraphs (a) through (d). 
(R. 116; August 31 Letter at 3.) 
22. The conditions set forth in the August 31 Letter were not part of the express 
terms of the REPC. Had the Harrisons accepted the conditions they would have waived 
their pending claims for breach of the REPC for failure to close within a reasonable time 
and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for exercising discretion under 
the REPC to deprive the Harrisons of the benefit of their bargain. Utah Code Ann. 78B-
5-802(3). 
23. In response to NY A's conditional tender of the Disputed Extension 
Payment, the Harrisons, through counsel, informed NY A that its "attempt to modify the 
10 
terms of the [REPC] and to make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon 
your client's unilateral and unexpressed intentions and 'understanding' is not only 
inappropriate, but constitutes a further breach of the parties' [REPC.]" (R. 114-153 (a 
;;;; copy of the Letter from J. Boren to K. Kelly, dated September 2, 2009 ("September 2 
Response") is attached to the addendum as Exhibit 9).) They further informed NY A that 
they would "continue to accept the monthly checks so long as you withdraw your 
inappropriate conditions." (R. 114-15; September 2 Response.) 
24. NY A refused to withdraw its inappropriate conditions and made no more 
ii/JP Extension Payments under the REPC, nor did it purchase the Property. 
25. In late 2011 and early 2012, the Harrisons and NYA cross-moved for 
summary judgment on all claims. Specifically, on November 8, 2011, the Harrisons filed 
a motion for summary judgment. (R. 110-80.) NY A opposed the motion on December 
7, 2011 (R. 192-224), and Harrison replied on December 19, 2011 (R. 229-65). NYA 
filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on January 9, 2012. (R. 290-319.) 
The Harrisons opposed the motion on February 24, 2012 (R. 325-51), and NYA replied 
on March 8, 2012 (R. 352-82). 
26. On June 14, 2012, the Court issued a Ruling on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment ("Ruling"). (R. 384-401.) The Harrisons appeal this Ruling and 
related Order, which held among other things, that: 
~ 3 The second page of the September 2 Response letter was not labeled in the 
record by the lower court, thus references to the letter shall be to R. 114-15. 
-...,J 11 
(a) Because NYA could extend the contract at its discretion, it did not 
deprive the Harrisons of the fruit of the contract when it exercised its discretion. 
(R. 387-88.) 
(b) NY A was not required to purchase the Property within a reasonable 
time because the REPC permitted it to exercise its discretion to extend closing 
indefinitely. (R. 386-87.) 
( c) The Disputed Extension Payment constituted valid tender because the 
letter accompanying the payment contained only conditions the Harrisons had 
agreed to when they permitted NY A to extend closing at its discretion. (R. 3 89-
91.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's summary judgment ruling should be reversed. NYA 
effectively sought to transform the REPC into a long-term financing agreement, which 
was not contemplated by the parties, and inappropriately used the tender rule to pressure 
the Harrisons into accepting this modification. NY A breached the REPC by exercising 
its discretion under the contract to deprive the Harrisons of the benefit of the bargain-
the sale of the property-and refusing to purchase the Property within a reasonable time, 
as required by Utah law. NY A further breached the contract by failing to make the 
August extension payment and failing to close within 30 days of its last Extension 
Payment, as required by the REPC. Conversely, the Harrisons never breached the REPC. 
They at all times remained willing to accept Extension Payments while the parties 
litigated the interpretation of the REPC, only refusing to accept the Disputed Extension 
12 
Payment, which would have required them to accept NY A's interpretation of the REPC, 
essentially ending the litigation in NY A's favor without allowing a court to adjudicate the 
dispute. The refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment under the circumstances here 
:J was not a breach of the REPC, let alone a material breach. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NY A and 
against the Harrisons. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
NYA VIOLATED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING BY USING ITS DISCRETION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 
REPC TO DEPRIVE THE HARRISONS OF THE BENEFIT OF THE 
BARGAIN 
The district court incorrectly ruled that because the REPC gave NY A "sole 
~ discretion" to extend the closing deadline indefinitely by making an Extension Payment, 
that it could exercise its discretion in a way that deprived the Harri sons of the benefit of 
the parties' bargain-the sale of the Property. (R. 387.) Specifically, it held that because 
the contract permitted NY A to "pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest 
money to continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline," which was left to 
NY A's "sole discretion," that requiring NYA to close in a reasonable amount of time 
would be inconsistent with an express term of the contract. (R. 392-93, 387.) It also held 
that there were disputed issues of fact about the parties' justified expectations. (R. 3 87.) 
Both rulings were in error: an express grant of discretion does not abrogate the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and the undisputed facts demonstrate that at the time the 
13 
parties entered into the REPC, they anticipated that NY A would purchase the Property 
within a reasonable time. 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, parties to a contract agree "not 
to intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the 
contract." Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ,I 18, 173 P.3d 865. An explicit 
statement giving NY A "discretion" does not remove the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing from the contract, but instead amplifies the duty. See Smith v. Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ,r 19, 84 P.3d 1154 ("[W]here one party has discretion over 
another according to the terms of a contract, that party must act with good faith and fair 
dealing."); CookAssocs. v. Utah Sch. & Inst. Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284, 
,r 27, 243 P.3d 888. Indeed, "[t]he degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the 
protections of the covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have 
defined their expectations and imposed limitations on the exercise of discretion through 
express contract terms." Markham, 2007 UT App 379 ,r 21 (quoting Smith, 2003 UT 57, 
,I 20). When "express contract terms" do not limit a party's exercise of discretion, the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is paramount. Id. While the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing cannot create "obligations inconsistent with express contractual 
terms," it can fill in the gaps in a contract with terms "the parties would doubtless have 
adopted if they had thought to address [them] by contract," so that one party cannot run 
amok with the discretion granted to it under the terms of the contract. Young Living 
Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64, ,r 10,266 P.3d 814 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
14 
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Courts have frequently implied a "reasonableness" limitation on the exercise of 
contractually permitted discretion. In Markham, the court supplied an "objective 
standard of reasonableness" to a seller's discretion to cancel a real estate purchase 
.;; contract if it disapproved of the buyer's financial information. Markham, 2007 UT App 
379 ,r 22. The court noted that without an objective reasonableness standard governing 
the seller's discretion, the seller's promise to sell the Property would be "illusory." Id. 
,r 23. Similarly, in Cook Assoc., a clause in a lease agreement gave the landlord "sole 
discretion" to raise rents every five years as the landlord deemed "reasonably necessary." 
\iii Cook Assoc., 2010 UT App 284, ,r,r 18, 27. The court held that because of the explicit 
grant of discretion to the landlord, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing served "to 
protect the other party from an inappropriate exercise of that discretion." Id. ,r 27. 
Because the contract imposed no "agreed formula" or "express standard," the landlord 
was required to exercise its discretion "reasonably within the contemplation of the 
parties" in accordance with their "purpose, intentions, and expectations" when it raised 
rent. Id. ,r,r 28-29. 
Here the Real Estate Purchase Contract gave NY A "sole discretion" with respect 
to when the closing would take place. Although NY A was required to pay additional 
money toward the purchase of the Property in order to secure an extension of the 
settlement deadline, there was no stated contractual limit on the number of times NY A 
could extend the deadline. Accordingly, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
.:;; required NYA to exercise its discretion "reasonably within the contemplation of the 
parties" in accordance with their "purpose, intentions, and expectations." Cook Assocs., 
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2010 UT App 284, ,r,r 28-29; see also Markham, 2007 UT App 379, ,r 21 ("Where the 
contract allows discretion but does not provide any express standard for exercising that 
discretion, the covenant imposes an objective standard of reasonableness."). It is 
undisputed that the parties entered into a purchase contract ( as opposed to an option 
contract or a seller-financed transaction), that NYA informed the Harrisons on several 
occasions that it would close within a relatively short period of time, and that the parties 
never agreed that closing could be postponed on the basis of the availability of the sewer 
line or the economic feasibility of development of the Property. Extending the closing 
for nearly two years beyond the parties' originally agreed-upon deadline deprived the 
Harrisons of the fruits of the contract in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as a matter of law. Taken to its extreme, this interpretation permits NY A to pay 
$6,250 per month interest-free until it pays off the Property in approximately forty years.4 
Given the fact that the REPC is a purchase contract, the age of the Harrisons, and the 
communications between the parties, such an interpretation is far outside the 
contemplation of the parties when they entered the REPC. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NYA and enter 
summary judgment for the Harrisons. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the district 
court and remand for a determination of whether NY A's conduct in extending closing for 
4 Had NY A obtained a $3,000,000 loan amortized over 40 years, his payments 
would have been approximately $17,563.70 per month at a 6.5% interest rate. The ~ 
present value of $3,000,000 paid over 40 years with a 6.5% rate of return is $291,666.56. 
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nearly three years beyond the original contract date and two years beyond the original 
closing date was at odds with the parties' justified expectations. 
II. NYA WAS REQUIRED TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY WITHIN A 
REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME 
When a contract does not specify a time for performance, "the law implies that it 
shall be done within a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter & Smith, 966 
~ P.2d at 858; see also Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App 201, ,r 27, 71 P.3d 188; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 204 (1981) ("When the parties to a ... contract 
have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights 
and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."). 
"An implied reasonable time limit is as much a part of the agreement as those terms that 
\,jj) are expressed." Coulter & Smith, 966 P.2d at 858. If the reasonable time for 
performance under a contract is clear based on the undisputed facts, the Court may rule as 
a matter oflaw. See IHC Health Servs. v. D&K Mgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,r 19, 196 P.3d 
588 (holding that the district court may resolve fact-dependent questions on summary 
judgment under appropriate circumstances); Contimortgage Corp. v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 
47 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("[T]he court may decide what is a reasonable 
time as a matter of law ... where the time taken is clearly reasonable or unreasonable 
that there can be no question of doubt as to the proper answer to the question."). 
Here, the REPC stated a settlement deadline of October 31, 2007, but granted 
"sole discretion" to NYA to extend that deadline an indefinite number of times in 30-day 
increments. The district court incorrectly ruled that because NY A extended the 
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unspecified closing deadline each time it made earnest money payments to the Harrisons, 
that the REPC included a specific time for performance term of payment date plus 30 
days. (R. 393-94.) On this ground, it declined to hold that NYA had an obligation to 
close on the Property within a reasonable time. But the fact that NY A had to fulfill a 
condition to maintain its indefinite time for performance does not somehow make the 
time for performance definite. Under the district court's interpretation, without a 
reasonableness term, NYA would be able to make interest-free payments on the property 
for forty years. During this time, the Harrisons would not be permitted to alter the 
Property in any way or to financially encumber it and would bear all costs of ownership. 
It is for situations like this that the law supplies a reasonableness term for time for 
performance, which the Court should supply here. 
NY A's failure to close on the Property by August 5, 2009, can be determined as a 
matter of law based on the following undisputed material facts: ( 1) The parties agreed to 
a closing date of October 31, 2007 (Factual Background~ 6), with an unspecified number 
of extensions thereafter; (2) In September 2007, NYA indicated to the Harrisons that 
closing "shouldn't be too far into the future" (id~ 12); (3) NYA did not seek to terminate 
or alter the contract during the Due Diligence Period to account for any kinks in its 
development plan ; ( 4) The Harrisons notified NY A on March 5, 2009, that August 5, 
2009 was a reasonable time for performance, which gave NY A five months to pull 
together the necessary financing to close on the Property (id~ 15); and (5) the parties 
agreed that time was of the essence in the performance of the REPC (id112). 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the denial of the Harrisons' motion for summary 
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judgment that NYA failed to close within a reasonable time. Alternatively, the Court 
should remand this case to the district court for a factual determination of a reasonable 
time to perform. 
~ III. THE DISPUTED EXTENSION PAYMENT WAS NOT VALID TENDER 
Because NY A's Disputed Extension Payment was conditioned on the Harrisons' 
acceptance ofNYA's interpretation of the REPC, it was not valid tender. Tender of 
payment is not valid if it "impose[ s] on the other party a new condition or requirement 
not already imposed by the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P .2d 123 8, 
\@) 1243 (Utah 1992). "The prohibition against conditional tender forbids the tendering 
party from adding new noncontractual conditions or requirements for receiving the 
tender." PDQ Lube Ctr. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 800 n.13 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also 
Century 21 All W Real Estate and Inv. Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982). If a 
party accepts tender of payment offered with conditions it is statutorily "precluded from 
objection afterwards." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-802(3). 
In Century 21, the Utah Supreme Court held that prospective buyers of real 
property had not made valid tender of performance to purchase the property when they 
sent a letter to the seller advising that they were "ready and willing to close on this 
transaction" because the buyers concurrently insisted that the sellers accept their 
interpretation of the contract's requirements as a condition of their performance. Century 
21, 645 P .2d at 54-56. The contract in Century 21 was silent on the specific condition in 
~ dispute. Id. On the other hand, in Kelley, where the contract explicitly required 
marketable title, the court held that conditioning performance on the clearing of a cloud 
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caused by a boundary dispute was not a conditional tender of performance. Kelley, 846 
P.2d at 1243-44. 
The district court held that the Disputed Extension Payment was "valid tender" 
because the August 31 Letter "only contained conditions that NY A already had a right to 
insist upon based on the REPC." (R. 390.) This was in error because the August 31 
Letter adds terms not expressly included in the REPC and at odds with the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and the inherent term of a reasonable time for performance. 
The REPC was silent on the economic feasibility of development or development 
potential of the Property, the availability of the sewer line, and the storm drain capacity. 
(Factual Background ifil 10-11.) Even if NY A had not breached the covenant at the time 
of the Disputed Extension Payment, had the Harrisons accepted NY A's terms, NYA 
could never breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by extending the closing 
deadline as it pertains to time to complete the purchase of the Property. In entering the 
REPC, the Harrisons never agreed that NY A could continue the closing date indefinitely 
for any possible reason. They never agreed to a 40-year installment purchase during 
which they would bear the costs of ownership with none of the benefits. NY A should not 
be permitted to use the tender rule to circumvent the adjudication of a good faith dispute 
over contractual terms. 
Even if "sole discretion" can plausibly be read to encompass the additional 
conditions imposed by the August 31 Letter (it cannot), the fact that the REPC is silent on 
these conditions is sufficient for the Court to hold that the additional conditions 
invalidated the tender. This is especially the case here because the Harrisons agreed to 
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accept the payment upon withdrawal of the conditions, an objection they were required to 
make under Utah Code section 78B-5-802. Specifically, had the Harrisons not raised 
their objections at the time NY A made the Disputed Extension Payment, they would have 
vJ been "precluded from objection afterwards." Utah Code § 78B-5-802(3 ). Under the 
district court's ruling, the Harrisons were in an impossible position: either agree to 
NYA's interpretation of the REPC, which meant giving up on their claims which were 
already the subject of litigation, or risk the district court finding them in breach for 
refusing the tender. This is an inappropriate use of the tender rule. Accordingly, the 
~ Court should reverse the district court's denial of the Harrisons' summary judgment 
motion and hold that the Disputed Extension Payment was not a valid tender, and NY A 
has breached the REPC as a matter of law by failing to purchase the Property or make 
Extension Payments. 
IV. THE HARRISONS DID NOT BREACH THE REPC BY REJECTING THE 
DISPUTED EXTENSION PAYMENT 
The Harrisons' refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment did not breach the 
REPC even if the Harrisons' interpretation of the REPC ultimately turned out to be 
wrong because the Harrisons remained willing to honor the contract. The district court 
held that the Harrisons' refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment violated its 
WiD contractual obligation to accept Extension Payments and constituted a breach of the 
contract. (R. 389-90.) This ruling was in error because the Harrisons never refused to 
extend the closing deadline, only to accept the $6,250 payment to do so. Moreover, even 
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if the refusal of a $6,250 payment was a breach of the REPC, in light of the $3,000,000 
purchase price, it was not a material breach relieving NY A of performance. 
A. The Harrisons Remained Willing to Perform Under the REPC 
Rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment was not a breach of the Harrisons' 
contractual obligation because the Harrisons remained ready, willing, and able to sell the 
Property, and never manifested a "positive and unequivocal intent" not to do so. Cobabe 
v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992) (explaining the standard for anticipatory 
repudiation). "[A]n anticipatory breach of contract is one committed before the time has 
come when there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words or acts 
evincing an intention to refuse performance in the future." Clarke v. Living Scriptures, 
Inc., 2005 UT App 225, ,I 13, 114 P.3d 602. As the district court correctly ruled, the 
Harrisons' negotiation and litigation over the terms of the REPC were not a "positive and 
unequivocai" statement that they would not abide by the terms of the REPC. The 
Harrisons' willingness to abide by the terms of the REPC continued even after they 
rejected the Disputed Extension Payment. The Disputed Extension Payment triggered the 
Harrisons' obligation to sell the Property to NY A within the next thirty days. At no time 
did the Harrisons repudiate this obligation, even in the face of what they considered a 
default in NY A's Extension Payments. In fact, the Harrisons specifically informed NY A 
at the time they returned the Disputed Extension Payment that they would "continue to 
accept the monthly checks," indicating that they remained willing to perform their 
contractual obligation. (Factual Background ,I 23.) Accordingly, the district court erred 
in ruling that the Harrisons breached their contractual obligations by rejecting the 
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Disputed Extension Payment, and the Court should reverse the entry of summary 
judgment against the Harrisons on this issue. 
B. Rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment Was Not a Material 
Breach 
Even if rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment was a breach of the REPC by 
the Harrisons, it was not a material breach or a repudiation of the contract under these 
i~ circumstances, and therefore did not excuse NY A's subsequent non-performance. Only 
"substantial" or "material" breaches of a contract excuse performance by the non-
breaching party. Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ~ 26,303 P.3d 1030 (internal 
citations omitted). A breach which is "incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of 
the contract" is not material. Id. ~ 27. "The relevant question is not whether the breach 
i.i?; goes to the heart of the provision breached, but whether it goes to the heart of the 
contract." Id. ~ 28. A district court considers the following factors when evaluating the 
materiality of a breach: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit 
which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can 
be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be 
deprived; ( c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to 
perform will suffer forfeiture; ( d) the likelihood that the party failing to 
perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the 
circumstances including any reasonable assurances; ( e) the extent to which 
the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports 
with standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. While the materiality of a breach is usually a question of fact, if the facts are 
undisputed, it is a question oflaw. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Considering these factors, the Harrisons did not materially breach the REPC as a 
matter of law by returning the Disputed Extension Payment. There is no question based 
on the Harri sons' response to the August 31 Letter that the Harrisons were still willing to 
sell the property to NY A under the terms of the REPC. As a result, NY A was not 
damaged by the Harrisons refusal of the Disputed Extension Payment. To the extent 
NY A was damaged, such damage could be calculated in the context of the lawsuit that 
was already proceeding at the time of the Disputed Extension Payment. Because the 
Harrisons remained willing to honor their obligation to sell the Property to NY A-and 
put that willingness in writing-neither party would suffer forfeiture as a result of the 
Harrisons' return of the Disputed Extension Payment. The Harrisons remained at all 
times willing to abide by the court's interpretation of the terms of the REPC. For the 
same reasons, the Harrisons' conduct did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. In contrast, NY A's actions in conditioning the Disputed Extension Payment on 
their interpretation of the contract were a clear violation of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court should reverse the district court 
and hold that the Harrisons' rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment was not 
material and that NY A was required to continue to make Extension Payments under the 
REPC. By failing to do so, NYA breached the REPC. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to NY A and denial of summary judgment to the Harrisons. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-802 
Statutes current through the 2014 General Session 
Utah Code Annotated > Title 78B Judicial Code > Chapter S Procedure and Evidence > 
Part 8 Miscellaneous 
788-5-802. Tender - Offer in writing sufficient - Objection - Must be 
specific or waived. 
(1) An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal 
property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or 
property. 
(2) The person to whom a tender is made shall, at the time, specify any objection to the money, instrument, 
or property, or it is considered waived. 
(3) If the objection is to the amount of money, the terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of property, 
the person shall specify the amounts, terms, or kind which is required, or be precluded from objection 
afterwards. 
History 
L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-27-1; C. 1953, 78-27-1; renumbered by L 2008. ch. 3. § 834. 
Annotations 
Notes 
Amendment Notes. -
..:J The 2008 amendment, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as 
§ 78-27-1, and added the (1) designation and (2) and (3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Ability to make tender good. 
Conditions. 
Extinguishing lien. 
Foreclosure. 
Interest. 
Tender. 
-By check. 
-By mail. 
-To attorney. 
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Ability to make tender good. 
Under this section, where a person makes a tender in writing, he is excused from actually producing the money at 
the time of making the tender, but the statute excuses no other act or requirement on his part which would be 
necessary to make a valid tender, independently of the statute. To have the effect of a valid tender, the party 
tendering must have the ability to produce it, and must act in good faith. Nor does such a tender deprive the creditor 
of the allowance of a reasonable time in which to ascertain the amount due, and to determine whether he will 
accept; and if he accepts, and debtor fails to produce the money, his tender will be of no avail. Hvams v. 
Bamberger. 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202, 1894 Utah LEXIS 1 (Utah 1894). 
Plaintiff did not make a valid tender because it failed to fulfill a condition of the cashier's check, and the defendant 
need not have objected to the tender of the check to prevail. PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P. 2d 792 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Conditions. 
A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon. 
Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d 974, 2 Utah 2d 351. 1954 Utah LEXIS 219 (Utah 1954). 
Extinguishing lien. 
Valid tender made by pledger of personal property at any time before sale will have the effect of extinguishing 
pledgee's lien. Hyams v. Bamberger. 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202, 1894 Utah LEXIS 1 (Utah 1894). 
In action against tractor dealer who wrongfully held plaintiff's tractor demanding the amount due on plaintiff's open 
account plus the amount of repairs, the evidence showed that the defendant was so adamant in its position that a 
tender of the amount of repairs would have been a "fruitless gesture" and, thus, plaintiff was excused from making 
the tender because it would have been useless. Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr .• 232 Utah Adv. 48, 869 P. 2d 1000, 1994 
Utah App. LEXIS 19 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied sub. nom., Jenkins v. Hesston 242 Utah Adv. 55, 879 P.2d 266. 
1994 Utah LEXIS 111 (Utah 1994). 
Foreclosure. 
In action to foreclose real estate contract, a valid tender of all existing delinquencies prevents plaintiff from 
foreclosing on the mortgage and note. Romero v. Schmidt, 392 P.2d 37, 15 Utah 2d 300, 1964 Utah LEXIS 252 
(Utah 1964J. 
Interest. 
If tender is made of full face of account, and no demand for interest is made, interest, at least for the purposes of 
a tender, is waived. Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co .• 48 Utah 434. 160 P. 283. 1916 Utah LEXIS 43 (Utah 
1916). 
Tender. 
-By check. 
Where a tender is made by check, the person to whom it is tendered must specify his objections or he will be 
deemed to have waived all objections, except such as he insists upon when tender is made. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. 
& Carpet Co .• 48 Utah 434. 160 P. 283 (1916). See also Ulibarri v. Christenson. 275 P.2d 170, 2 Utah 2d 367. 1954 
Utah LEXIS 224 (Utah 1954). 
A check for the amount due, presented within time and when no exception is taken to the form of the tender, is a 
valid and legal tender of the amount due, but only when there are adequate funds in the account of the drawer to 
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pay such check upon presentation in due course. Sieverls v. White. 273 P2d 974, 2 Utah 2d 351. 1954 Utah LEXIS 
219 (Utah 1954). 
Plaintiff did not make a valid tender because it failed to fulfill a condition of the cashier's check, and the defendant 
need not have objected to the tender of the check to prevail. PDQ Lube Ctr .• Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
-By mail. 
Tender of check by mail is good tender in absence of special objections. Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 
48 Utah 434. 160 P. 283. 1916 Utah LEXIS 43 (Utah 1916). 
-To attorney. 
~ A tender to an attorney with authority to collect is the same as though made to creditor himself. Hirsh v. Ogden 
Furniture & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434. 160 P 283, 1916 Utah LEXIS 43 (Utah 1916). 
Research References & Practice Aids 
_;;; Cross-References. -
Settlement offers, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68. 
Uniform Commercial Code, Sales, tender of payment, § l0A-2-511. 
Utah Code Annotated 
vi, Copyright© 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEW YORK A VE., LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS 
FORSUMMARYJUDGMENT 
Date: June 14, 2012 
Case No: 090402295 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
1bis matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The motion were 
fully briefed and argued before the court on April 19, 2012. The court has been fully informed 
and for reasons more fully set forth below denies defendant's motion and grants plaintiff's 
motion in part. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for summmy judgment will be granted where "the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law," and "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id at (e). 
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Additionally, the court "will view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion." Brower'v. Brown, 144 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1987). 
1. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
NY A is a Utah limited liability company doing business in Utah County, Utah. Steven 
Kelly is the registered agent and manager of NY A. 
2. The Hanisons are the owners of over 20 acres of real property located at approximately 
950 West 700 South in the Springville, Utah (the "Property"). 
3. On or about November 10, 2006, the parties entered into a real estate purchase contract 
("REPC") whereby NY A agreed to purchase the Property for $3 million. 
4. Addendum #1, signed along with the REPC, provided that the Settlement Deadline 
wasl80 days from the date of the fully executed contract. 
5. Addendwn # 1 provided as follows: 
"The Buyer may choose, at his sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of non~ 
refundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline. 
This additional money will be paid monthly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and will be a 
credit towards the purchase price at closing." 
6. On November 22, 2006, the parties entered into Addendum #2. 
7. Addendum #2 provided that the "settlement deadline is to be extended until after the 
harvest season 2007 which will be October 31, 2007." 
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8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Addendum #2 reduced the Extension Payments to $6,250 per month and required the 
Harrisons to include 20.27 water shares with the purchase. 
The parties have not agreed in writing to a limitation on the number of extensions of the 
settlement deadline that NY A may secure by timely payment of the Extension Payment. 
The REPC and addenda provided that the initial earnest money deposit of $10,000 along 
with the monthly Extension Payments all constitute non•refundable earnest money that 
would have been applied to the purchase price at closing. 
The parties have not entered into any addenda to the REPC other than Addendum #1 and 
Addendum #2 nor any other written agreements modifying the REPC. 
REPC Addendwn #2 states that the "date of the fully executed contract is to be the latest 
signature date on this Addendwn #2," which is November 22, 2006. 
Section 21 of the REPC states that "Time is of the Essence." 
14. Under the terms of the REPC, NYA had 90 days from the date of the fully executed 
contract to conduct due diligence (the "Due Diligence Deadline"). 
15. If, prior to the Due Diligence Deadline, NY A determined that the results of its due 
diligence were unacceptable, it could choose to cancel the contract or to provide written 
notice to the Harrisons of its objections. 
16. After the Due Diligence Deadline the earnest money was "deemed earned and non-
refundable thereafter if Buyer fails to close for any reason." 
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17. On January 30, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons informing them of a 
problem connecting the Property to the Springville sewer system. He further stated: 
"It looks like I won't be able to develop the property until mid-2008 at the earliest. 
However, I like the property and want to continue the contract as it is currently 
written ... On October 31st I will start making the monthly payments to you that we agreed 
upon until I close the property, which will be when the sewer trunk line is installed and I 
can get the necessary approvals from the city to develop." 
18. On September 19, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons updating them on his 
progress in developing the Property. Specifically, he informed them that he had found a 
way to work around the problem with connecting to the Springville sewer system. He 
further stated, "I will be paying the extension fees as outlined in the purchase contract 
until I close. It shouldn't be too far into the future." 
19. In October 2007, NYA began making the monthly Extension Payments in accordance 
with the tenns of the REPC and its addenda. 
20. In early 2008, Mr. Kelly attempted to get approval from Springville City to work around 
the sewer trunk line issue. 
21. In April 2008, Mr. Kelly disclosed to his site engineer Brian Gabler that "[W]e are 
holding off pursuing this at the current time." 
22. In July 2008, Mr. Harrison informed Mr. Kelly that he did not want to wait any longer for 
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NY A to close. 
23. In December 2008, Mr. Harrison began discussing with Mr. Kelly his options for 
tenninating the contract. The parties did not come to an agreement. 
24. On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons through their attorney, Steve Newman, sent a letter to 
NY A stating that it had been 16 months since the original Settlement Deadline and that 
any reasonable time for closing had passed. 
25. The March S, 2009 letter asserted that NYA was in breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, but that the Harrisons were willing to close on or before 
August 5, 2009. 
26. The March 5, 2009 letter asserted that if not closed by August 5, 2009, the Harrisons 
reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC. 
27. On April 22, 2009, NYA's counsel sent a letter that stated, "My clients have the right to 
continue making the Extension Payments under the Contract, without an arbitrary and 
artificial August 5, 2009 deadline." 
28. NY A did not agree in writing, or otherwise, to the August 5, 2009 closing date. 
29. On May 14, 2009, after a failed settlement negotiation, the Harrisons infonned NYA that 
it expected it to continue to perform its obligations Wlder the REPC. 
30. On August 31, 2009, NYA's counsel sent Harrison's counsel the Extension Payment 
along with a letter that contained that following: 
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(a) The purchase price for the property was based on the assumption that it could be 
developed as single family residential that would maximize the development potential of 
the land based on the zoning laws in place that govern the subject property. With the lack 
of sewer capabilities, and through further information garnered through the development 
process that showed insufficient stonn drainage capacity, the property could not (at the 
time) be developed to its maximum potential. 
(b) The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could be developed to its 
maximum potential was crucial to my clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a 
credit towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the REPC and was in no 
way to be considered "rent" or an interest payment. 
( c) The closing deadline was being extended and the Extension Payment reduced in part 
to account for the fact that, since the sewer was not readily available, it might be some 
time before the property could be developed as anticipated. 
( d) The REPC could be extended, at [NY A's] discretion as stated in the REPC, to allow 
for the property to be developed to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to: 
sewer line extension installed to the property, storm drainage readily available, and 
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property being economically feasible to develop under zoning ordinance of Springville 
City and existing market conditions. 
31. The August 2009 letter accompanying the Extension Payment stated, "Nothing in this 
letter should be construed as a demand by [Plaintiff] for any rights or benefits other than 
those provided under the REPC." 
32. The Harrisons refused to accept the August 2009 Extension Payment as presented and in 
a letter from their counsel to NY A's counsel stated, "[Y]our attempt to modify the terms 
of the [REPC] and to make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon your 
client's unilateral and unexpressed intentions and 'understanding' is not only 
inappropriate, but constitutes a further breach of the parties' [REPC.]" 
33. The Harrisons informed NY A that they would "continue to accept the monthly checks so 
long as [NYA] withdraw [its] inappropriate conditions." 
34. NY A has not closed on the Property and has not made or attempted to make any 
extension payments since August 2009. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Time of Performance 
The Harrisons argue that NY A breached by failing to perform within a reasonable time. 
"[I]f a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done within 
a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter & Smith Ltd v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852,858 
(Utah 1998) (citing Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989,990 (Utah 1986)). "When the parties to a 
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bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is 
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the 
circumstances is supplied by the court." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204. A court "may 
allow a contract to be performed within a reasonable time only when the contract is silent as to 
the time for its performance." Watson v. Hatch. 728 P.2d 989,990 (Utah 1986). 
The parties explicitly agreed in the REPC and the addenda that the settlement deadline 
would be October 31, 2007 ... They also agreed that NY A "may choose, at its sole discretion, to 
pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after 
the settlement deadline." Therefore, each monthly extension payment extended the settlement 
deadline to the end of the following month. 
The Hanisons use the Tenth Circuit case Navair, Inc. v. /FR Americas, Inc. (utilizing 
Kansas law) to assert that the reasonable time requirement still applies even if the contract 
contains a specific date for performance that has been extended. 519 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 
2008). The Navair case is distinguishable from the present case. Navair involved a contractual 
dispute regarding the length of time an oral extension of the contract was valid for. The present 
case involves a contract which clearly states that extensions will be allowed and each extension 
will continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline. Unlike Navair, there is no 
ambiguity regarding the extension of the contract deadline so long as a valid tender of extension 
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payment was made. Because the contract specified a time for performance, the court cannot 
impose a reasonable time. 
The Harrisons contend that allowing NY A to continue making the extension payments 
indefinitely would lead to absurd results in that it would allow NYA to make interest-free 
payments for 40 years until the extension payments amounted to the purchase price. The 
Harrisons meanwhile would be forced to continue paying the carrying costs including property 
taxes. The Harrisons further argue that this could not have been the original intention of the 
parties because the parties did not execute the standard Seller Financing Addendum nor indicate 
anywhere in the REPC that they intended to create a seller-financed transaction. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in, Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larken-Gifford-Overton, LLC, that 
"[w]here the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract 
may be interpreted as a matter oflaw." 207 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2009). "Only if the language 
of the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent." Id 
The evidence before the court shows that the parties agreed to the extension payment 
clause of the contract. Addendum # 1 of the REPC specifically states that NY A "may choose, at 
his sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the 
contract monthly after the settlement deadline." It does not limit the number of times that the 
extension payments may be made, only that it is in NY A's sole discretion. The wording is clear 
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and unambiguous; therefore, NY A was entitled to extend the settlement deadline so long as valid 
tender of the extension payment was made. 
NY A's statements in letters sent to the Harrisons regarding the time frame for settling 
constitute extrinsic evidence and cannot be considered by the court in determining if the contract 
contained a specific time for performance. 
2. Anticipatory Breach 
NY A claims that the Harrisons anticipatorily breached the contract by asserting that NY A 
was in default and demanding closing occur on August 5, 2009. As evidence of anticipatory 
breach, NYA points to comments made by Mr. Harrison to the effect that he wanted his $3 
million and that he was not willing to wait around anymore. On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons' 
attorney sent a letter to NY A stating that it had been 16 months since the original settlement 
deadline and that any reasonable time for closing had passed. NY A claims that this letter implied 
that NY A was in breach of its performance under the REPC. The letter also stated that the 
Harrisons were willing to close on or before August 5, 2009, and that ifNYA did not close by 
that date then the Harrisons reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC. In addition, 
NY A points to the Harrisons' answers to the amended complaint in this action. Lastly, NYA 
points to the Harrisons' refusal to accept the August 31, 2009 Extension Payment as evidence of 
anticipatory breach. 
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"An anticipatory breach of contract is one committed before the time has come when 
there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words or acts evincing an intention 
to refuse perfonnance in the future." Upland Industries Corp. v. P. Gamble Robinson Co., 684 
P .2d 63 8, 64 3 (Utah 1984 ). An anticipatory breach occurs only if a party to a contract "manifests 
a positive and unequivocal intent not to render its promised perfonnance." Cobabe v. Stanger, 
844 P.2d 298,303 (Utah 1992). 
The Harrisons did not anticipatorily breach the contract. Although the Harrisons 
demanded that NY A close on or before August 5, 2009 and Mr. Harrison expressed his desire to 
either close or have NY A stop payments, these facts, especially viewed in a light most favorable 
to the Harrisons, do not "manifest a positive and unequivocal intent not to render [their] 
promised performance." Id The Harrisons' statements, the letter and the pleadings are better 
described as negotiation and litigation techniques, not a manifestation of their intention to refuse 
future performance. 
3. The August 31, 2009 Extension Payment Constituted Valid Tender 
The letter accompanying the August 2009 Extension Payment lists the reasons why NY A 
originally intended to purchase the Property, namely, to develop for single-family residential 
homes; and the reasons why NY A has faced delays in readying the Property for development, 
namely, the sewer capabilities and storm drainage. Section ( d) of the letter states: 
"The REPC could be extended, at my client's discretion as stated in the 
REPC, to allow for the property to be developed to its full potential. This 
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includes, but is not limited to: sewer line extension installed to the property, 
storm drainage readily available, and property being economically feasible to 
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville City and existing market 
conditions." 
The Hanisons claim that NY A breached the express tenns of the REPC by making the 
August 2009 Extension Payment contingent on the Harrisons' acceptance of additional terms and 
failing to make any subsequent Extension Payments. 
"In order to be valid, tender of payment of money due must be ... unconditional." PDQ 
Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber 949 P.2d 792, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "A tender, to be good, must be 
free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon." Sieverts v. 
White, 2 Utah 2d 351,273 P.2d 974 (Utah 1954). "The tender cannot impose on the other party a 
new condition or requirement not already imposed by the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial 
Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992). 
The August 2009 Extension Payment only contained conditions that NYA already had a 
right to insist upon based on the REPC, and therefore the extension payment was unconditional. 
The REPC does not explicitly state that closing would take place when it is economically feasible 
to develop, or based on the sewer line availability, storm drainage issues, or when the property 
could be developed to its maximum potential. The contract does, however, allow for extensions 
according to the Buyer's sole discretion. NY A's letter to the Harrisons noting its reasons for 
making the Extension Payments was a display of its discretion. The reasons for extending the 
closing are irrelevant inasmuch as those reasons flesh out NY A's discretion. The letter did not 
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add additional terms to the contract because according to the contract, NY A has the right to 
extend at its discretion. NY A's letter required the Harrisons to acknowledge rights that the 
contract had already granted to NY A; therefore, the August 2009 Extension Payment cannot be 
viewed as an invalid tender of payment. The Harrisons therefore breached the contract by 
refusing the valid tender. 
When the Harrisons refused the August extension payment they told NY A that they 
would accept the extension payments so long as they were not accompanied by additional 
conditions. They claim that because NY A failed to tender any other payments that NY A was in 
breach of the REPC. "[U]nder the 'first breach' rule 'a party first guilty of a substantial or 
material breach of contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perfonn. He 
can neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other party 
for a subsequent failure to perform."' CCD, L. C. v. Millsap, 116 P.3d 366, 373 (Utah 2005) 
(quoting Jackson v. Rich, 28 Utah 2d 134,499 P.2d 279,280 (1972)). 
Because the Harrisons refused the valid tender of the August 2009 Extension Payment, 
NY A's refusal to make any further extension payments is not a "failure to perform." The 
Hanisons were the first party to breach the contract and "cannot ~:mm plain if the other party 
(NY A) thereafter refuses to perform." Id 
A final note as to the August tender: the court did not give credence to the language in the 
letter accompanying the August tender which stated ''Nothing in this letter should be construed 
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as a demand by [NY A] for any rights or benefits other than those provided under the REPC." 
Although the court agrees with this statement, the court was not influenced by it. If the letter had 
in fact required the Harrisons to agree to additional terms, the statement would have carried no 
weight so the court analyzed the letter without regard to that statement. . 
4. Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The Utah Supreme Court, in U.S. Fidelity v. U.S. Sports Specialty, defines the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing as "a duty not to intentionally or purposely do anything [that] will 
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract and to ... act 
consistently with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." 
U.S. Fid v. U.S. Sports Specialty, 270 P.3d 464,470 (Utah 2012). 
Utah looks to the justified expectations of the parties to determine breach of good faith 
and fair dealing. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P .2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991 ). 
This requires the court to look beyond the terms of the contract because an examination of 
contract terms alone is insufficient to determine the justified expectations of the parties. Id 
However, "[n]o such covenant may be invoked ... if it would create obligations inconsistent with 
express contractual terms." Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 266 P.3d 814, 110 (Utah 
2011). "While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, ... this 
covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to which the parties did 
not agree ex ante." Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, ,r 45 (Utah 2004). 
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NY A has presented facts that it intended to extend the contract until it could develop the 
property and the Harrisons have brought forth facts that show they wanted a speedy closing. Thus 
there is a fact issue as to the parties' justified expectations. In addition, the Harrison's claim as to 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is denied because the contract granted NY A 
the right to the extensions according to NY A's sole discretion and to find them in breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be inconsistent with the express tenns of the 
contract and would be the enforcement of duties to which the parties did not initially agree to. 
5. Additional Earnest Money Deposits Apply to the Purchase Price 
NY A seeks a swnmary declaratory judgment that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits 
apply to the purchase price. Addendum #2 changed the amount of the monthly extension 
payment from $12,500 to $6,250; nothing in Addendwn #2 changed the provision that the 
Additional Earnest Money Deposits were to be applied to the purchase price at closing. The 
Harrisons do not dispute this claim and state that they have never disputed this claim during the 
course of this litigation. NY A is therefore entitled to declaratory judgment that the Additional 
Earnest Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price. 
6. No Limitation on the Number of Extension Payments 
The REPC does not expressly limit the number of extension payments that the Buyer is 
entitled to so long as the $6,250 extension payment is timely made. "A contract should be 
reformed only when its terms are so vague that the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained 
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therefrom." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 511 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 1973). Placing a limit 
on the number of extension payments allowed would be refonning the contract and thereby 
rewriting the parties' agreement. The contract in this case is clear, and NYA is entitled to 
declaratory judgment that the REPC does not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is 
entitled when it timely pays the Extension Payments. 
7. Motion to Strike 
Defendants moved to strike portions of the Steven Kelly affidavit. While the motion was 
well-taken, the issue is ultimateiy moot because the court did not rely on paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10 or 
13 of the affidavit in ruling on this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Carlson v. Hamilton said, "People should be entitled to 
contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism by courts in the alleviation of 
one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain. Also, they should be permitted to enter into 
contracts that actually may be Wll"easonable or which may lead to hardship on one side." 332 
P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958); See also Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084, 1089 (Utah 1988) 
(holding that courts should intervene and alter the contractual provisions only when the 
enforcement of the terms of the uniform real estate contract would be unconscionable). Though 
the Harrisons argue that allowing for indefinite extension payments would lead to absurd results, 
the courts may not step in to alleviate the effects of a bad bargain. 
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The contract in this case provides for a specific time of performance; therefore, this court 
cannot imply a reasonable time of performance. While the Harrisons' actions prior to August of 
2009 did not manifest anticipatory repudiation of the contract, the Hanisons refusal to accept the 
August 2009 Extension Payment was an actual breach of the contract. Since the Harrisons 
breached the contract first by refusing a valid tender, they cannot then claim a breach by NY A in 
failing to perform. Because the Harrisons breached, NY A is entitled to its contractual remedies. 
Plaintiff's motion for swnmary judgment is granted as to au· claims except for the claim 
that the defendants breached the agreement anticipatorily, and Defendants' motion for swnmary 
judgment is denied. Additionally, Plaintifrs motion for partial declaratory summary judgment is 
granted in that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits apply to the purchase price and 
Defendants may not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely 
pays the Additional Earnest Money Deposits. Plaintiff's counsel will draft an order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated this 14th day of June 2012. 
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BY THE COURT: 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
\'Z,rzJ\ \'Z \0P 099uty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UT AH COUNTY, ST ATE OF UT AH 
NEW YORK A VE., LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants. 
ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 090402295 
Judge: David N. Mortensen 
This matter having come before the Court for hearing on April 19, 2012 on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties 
were represented by counsel. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits 
and other evidence present and on file, having heard the parties arguments, and otherwise being 
fully advised in the premises, issued its Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Based 
on the Court's Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court now enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to NYA 's Second Claim for 
Relief for Breach of REPC is granted, except for the claim of that Defendants anticipatorily 
breached the REPC, and Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies. 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Third Claim for 
Relief for Declaratory Judgment is granted and iti is hereby ordered that the Additional Earnest 
Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price under the REPC and that the REPC does not 
limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely pays the Extension 
Payments .. 
4. Because the Harrisons breached, Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies. 
However, the previous ruling of the court did not determine the amount of Plaintiffs damages. 
The issue of the amount of Plaintiffs damages, costs and attorneys fees is reserved at this time 
to be the subject of further motions or trial. 
Dated and signed this Sltay of b,u . . 201:z,;... Ort .. :---
.~~-·~*:!;::\ f/T . 
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Jason D. Boren 
BALLARD SP AHR, LLP 
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J.~~~(1:'«ft'l.tlesd,~ d-..a!~. Se!ter~ to ~m!4~ 8uydr, Ow D~~and ~ ;a fln&I ~
in~ undar~ 11. 
ll.1 Dua D5flgtl~ Oft.adJJ5te.. NQ 1$ts.r ~ trt-e Dua DU~ o.tatUirre re~encao in SeetiOn 24{b) Buyor ehA!t: (a) 
ootnprta /JIil ct~ QUflJ Ollgama: end (b) dewmine-11 lhe ~s.or B~ Du& OilfvMa ein'I 3(:0;~ lo Buyst. 
8.2. Right=o 0.1'Cd ot ~ If teuyet detm'~ th!Jt fh&.'9$Uft3 IJI ~'!; DtAl Olllgeocra ate uriacoeptabl&, a..~ 
~. r,o lat1tr thatJ lhe 0~ Pffia~c;:i, Deitr.Uine, -ciilh&r. (a) Ctdfl¢el tbis Contract bypovicfin9 written notice to s~11ar. 
~u;ion th~ Ea-nG$! Moiney Oapo:s(t shaJ! be l1Gfaaft6d to Buyer. er (b} ~ 5$JIW wilh w(sff,ar, ROticlJ of ObRetiontJ, 
u Fdt1re co~ lfby b e,q,il'lltkm o,f ttur Ovll Oi~ Oea6fm, B"l"1' ~ nee: {a) cance-1 this C(ltl~· 'J 
aa provMJQQ In ~8.2; or (b} ae«v6r a wntter1 objcictlcn 10 Sen~r cegardi"f} lhe ~~ O~oa. Toe S\,y ~ 
Due Difigenco chd h daertled ~Od by ev,o,: and 1h11 CX>Nm9e~:. rafuf\lnced in Sec6oM 6(8) th;to~ 8fsJJ ;_:, 
~ngmtm:tt11tn1!¥ttc.anrflmandng~.9"\8'1be~wab,sdb1~- : ... , 
SA R.e.saa,so bv Sielkr. Jf au,_. ~vidas written cbjedions to Sanar .. 91.flOr snd Stier s.htlfl ,have ~ r:steMff-i 
~dim' Sarws mcelpld~ ~~ (~ Periocf1 In~ ro pgrd'ic\ 'MiUng ~ ~ msnnnr~., 
l!uye,'s:~ El<cepr es pc,M:184 In S8C1ion ,o.2, _.,...,, bul - se. _,,,_ 11>. -Auy,:,".efE 
Pa,,Q2alS .... s-lontt,b 0..?-t. Daao H/40/oi;. _,,,_ °":"' uh(t-.' '·".-'.' 
-·----. --·---- ••• ·-·-·---· -➔ ·-·- •• -
~ 10 00 re:a2p 
t'l'V..- V'IJ VU '-'4'• C..~ 
«)joelicm,, U 8~ ~n« Se~ i,ev& not &QrQad ir, writil\9 ~n the mannor o( r&«oMf"i9 Buyar"s ob,}actiont, 8L~f rnoy 
~ ~ Cort!tstt by provid~g written notfeo 1o Se!1et no~ U121'\ lht\?o ~1en:j3f CfQr- ~8f CJ~ of the ftv3sponu 
Parioc:t Cha Eamast ~ 0~t &"811 be ral9aUd lo 8vysr. ,r 1hls Conttad i3 not QUlOl'!lod by 'dvyer undar 
lt-cb ~a.•.~~~ sl\al\ba ~o ~ ftf ~uyar. This waiva- s.halJ r\M a."itsct \hr>g:e itnrM warmnli3d 
inS0dkm 10. 
t. ADOn'IONAL TERMS. Th~re [)CJ ~ l J ARE NOT addqltdu to ths& 05ntraet coftfalimg add~ 1etms. If th~e-
are. the l!fmS of th., fOl1owlrg addenda sre ln~ Into lhis. Coritraet by \hi& tefereMe: [)(.J Adffllmda:r Mo:.1 l [ J Selfw Finaic:ing Addendum· ( J 0abor lsipadfy) _________ .._ _________ _ 
1 o. SEIJ.l:R WAAAA.trnES AND R&RES£MTA TJ01'$. 
1a.1 c:cndlt!o1> of Tl1'4. Selerroprosenla lhatSdt:t haa JMSSe to the ~411d wi9 ca,wey 900d iDtb(j ~b!o 
~ to-SoyoratQJsirla by ~wemll)l1 ~ Buye,-89fed, ~-to~ Ell& to &f'IOPre~awjed 10th& 
to~ ff'a51ltata0f reeorct e~ "8.. d&ed  0C81n1 (ntozaning eovanDtds. ~ '1tal ~,. JITld 
rtghl:1.-or~ and tllbjeGtto Iha 0Dllom.'1 of lh& Corrtnltmenl rotTih-1~ - ~ t6 by Buy« untlsrSOttbrt 0. 
su,ermso~ to~ 1!16 ~ lWb}ad b exis&tg t8ale$ 8'fedit\a Iha~ amnotetp(ttna ,irior to ~no-
Buyo, ~ to ba r~le rot lai:es_ ~nts. homo(n,m$f5 a~IOft dUQS, ~ and'OIMJ"~ 
p~ ro the Property &tftet Clo$ing. Saller wm cause~ ba paid off by Closing arr morlgaoaa. truai ~. Juisgman1&, 
rnechanSc's lions_ tax TIBns. sl'ld ltnirmttts.. soiw,wta ~ua to ~ paid wmtnt bY ~ng au asse~ af'd ~nGB 
~~ .. 
IF A'ttY PORTION OF TN£ PRQ~SUY ,s PR:ESl:Mn. V A.Ss~seo AS ""'GRatN@ELr (CHECK Ali'PUCP.f.'J Lf:_ 
&0)0: 
( l se.t.eR pg BUYER SttALL ee RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF ANY AOLL-SACK TAXES ~.&$£SSfiD 
ACA\WS.TnE~ • 
. 1tU CoA(tltJtlll of Propony. Seiter warrants tnaa th& Pro~r!y will bl! in tne following condition ON nu.~ OJl T€ 
SEI..L.EA o~s PHV'SICAl. P0$SESSSON TO bUYeR: 
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(D) PO naarmaima~bO ~lnlO; (c)no ~t~cr~toGla ~shah b&rnsde or 
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~w&mnlia\S. ~nc,1ngs «~~\ho ~nu Contracf CSMOt &a d\mnged es:cepa ~ 
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15. DeSPlJY'E AIE$CUJTION. The ~les a9n,?- tt\3t any d~. aMing prlot r.o ot after C!osfng. ma~ to ,ttls ~ 
(~app~bo~ [ JSHM,l ,.,,, 
pq li!AV ATTJE OP110t4 OF'JMEP~ :~ 
fir.st bo ~to~ If rho plJlttle,s~ 10 roodlnlion. Iha dispuu,. :mddl b« sv~ to l'nN~klil °"'"°ugh i,: ~ ptowidar IJnAUdy apc,od t4)0n b'j lha each patr.y ~ t.o boar ns. own c~ ol tMdntlon. tf nu:~~: 
~ lhta~ aq,d ~edii8s avalliabb Ul'Kmf lhts Contracr SMU ~I)'. No\tling in~ ~iof\ 15 ~ff Cl~'~[ 
31lY p;3f1',y {n)m abekin(J ~ equ\\able mf.el' pctl\OV\g ~ . ;.~,1• 
1&. tJfEFADLT. Ir BV)(GT~ SeUei-maydea dihef eo refQtn the Earnesl Monn)' Oap:gJt as~ <1Mlla9a:s..d,;' ..' 
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tbv 10 00 ta02p p.4 
n-crY v.:r u-i:> U.:aJ c. ,~ Q~ a-.;, I J- 'TC:.• "T f"""" 
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~
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in ~dialbn fffld&r Sdon 1S. 
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referenced in Pl~ C°onlr$C{. 
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2(. TfM& IS OP 1KE GSs&JCli. r.ma lsil oflhe lll$81'\m teg3t8i.n; 1t\a d&t4e s« ~ (r\ ~Contract.~& m\J&i be 
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Cha HmlftO ~mmnt (La..~. eta.). Patfcmmr,cirt ~- .afld flmet nareronced herreln S.hBU l'sCs( ba blndlng u.l)Dft. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Page 1 of I 
TH'5 IS AN ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE GONTRACT (the •REPC") with m, 
Offer Reference Date of November 9. 2006 between Ne'N York Ave. I.LC. as Buyer. and Hanison. D,,vid ~ 
Jan, as Sal1er, regarding the Property, 20.27 Acres off 950 Wand app~mately 700 Sin Springville, lJl · 
Parcef #26:041:0031, Springville, utah 84663. The following terms are hereby incorporated a.c:. part of IM 
REPC: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Seller disclosure: deadline to be 14 days from date of fulJy executed contract. 
Due diligence deadllne to be 90 days from date of fully executed contract to do any and all due 
di\ig~ '\ha\ '\hr: buyer deems n~~-ary or prudent \o de\:erm\ne, 'lht1\. '\he: property \s. ~a,\i~iac\o\"'j 101 ·. · 
Buyer's intended use. The due diligenee approval shall be at the buyer's sole and absolute discretion. 
Setliement deadfine to be 180 days from date offully ~ecuted contract 
4_ $3,000,000 purchase price is based on the assumption thet the property contains 20.27 Acres, which · 
equates to $143,002 per acre. If the exact acreage Is more or less than 20.27 acres the purchose price _ 
will Increase or decrease accordingly based on $148,002 per acre. ~ _:-:_-
5. Buyer wifl deposit the eamest money with First American Tith, Company Jocated in Orem. Utah, within s_ · 
business days from the date of a fully execuled contract _::,..,.·. ·. 
6. Buyer to pay Sellers closing costs not to exceed $10,000. 
:_ 
7. Seller agrees to sign within a reasonabfe time period all pertinent applications and documents required 
for governmental approval of Buyer's proposed development 
8. Seller agrees to give ac:ccss to the Property during duyfight hours for any testing, rnspectlons, 
surveying, and other similar secvfces for developing the Property, as the Buyer deems necessary. If 
any type of large motorized equipment will be brought onto the property it will b8 coordinated through 
the currant lessee of the property as to minimize the impact on the current crop. 
9. Buyer wm be deemed to have approved the Property if the Guyer has not terminated this agreement by 
th~ Due Diffgence Deadline. The day folfowing the Due Diligence Deadline, the title company will 
disperse the earnest money to tt,e Seifer. This earnest money wrn then be deemed earned and norr 
refundable thereafter If Buyer fans to close for any reason. Released earnest money Is the sole remedy 
to the Seller tf tfla Buyer faUs to close for any reason. 
1 o. The Buyer may choose. at hfs sore discretion. to pay an addilionaf amount of nolHefrmdable earnest,. 
money to continue the e9nhact monthly after the sefflement deadline.. This adrfifional moneywill be pat (! 
monfhly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and wm be a crecfrttowards the p~asa price at closing_ ;_ 
£', 
11. ff Buyer tenninates ttiis transaction for any reason, Buyer WJ1l tum over au surveys, engineering, soi r 
reports-, phase 1 reporf:s. efo. that may have been compfeted at no additior;ftostto lhe Setler. . . · 
. ~~ 
Seller shall have until 5:00 PM Mountain TI me_ November 1 B, 2006, to accept fue terms of this AODENOUif:~ 
NO. 1 ln acoordanc-e With the provisions of Section 23 qf the REPC. Un fess so accepted, .the offer as set:·:• 
forth Jn this AODe.,DUM NO. 1 shall lt:Ipse. · 
~Ji½~ 1~\;1(1,, -.;q-:,,pM. .n g/•: 
Yorlc e,LLC ) e Time ~· · 
.., 
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L J R~i:CTlON: Se~r h~E,by rej~ tho le1'1T1S ortM A00£Nl)LJM NO. 1. 
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AOOENDUM NO. Z 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
l'HIS IS AN (XJ ADDENOOS I 1 COU~ lo hit REAL l:SiAffl PUR0-1ASE CON"i'AACT' ~ ~) ~ 
e11 Qbr Retetvnm Oate. of Nrw@fflMC 9 200$ ~~g aft~~~ OilUMe~ Nffl Ywls 
&'ft. LLC: ari au,sr. artd HPrtlim, Qayld & Jog as S6tW, rspd!na ~  ~ m e\mlWl!i zoo S 950 
W SpriQq,,ftl3 ff4fffl3 28::fl§1:Jll,31- Tim mflAWinO tsm1a ~ ~ ii'\acl~ed EIS pt!ltt of lhe- REPC: 
~,e,Js IP Jorauda R'1.£ttP'1BJ)atety 20.21 uater 3bffl:&a. whtcb wn• bft taJ.m.E@rrM by Sene,r_to, ]-
S!mnAYllJft ~PH lbftlc IMYfJ"@fflftDI for 8>13ffit'S RmPPJWf RMiAMlftot. 
2.ftuvoc ts m.PZllt SaJlla;elQalng PPmWbfCb lndudft;md nm.UmileJtJAJ;Jie insurauce tiJle fees.. 
ascmw fus amt gruobd mOback b)XQS Smrer o ,o net sa mlM t:m: pmceayaflm: tbf§ft f9es am 
wili1.. 
a Pa ot My exfttYlod saotNMJ Ia ro be the lmtm;t $lgnatum dm on tbJs Add§ndum fl2 
4 SftWameptdeftdUac Is tg betudeodQrl Ufllftaffgir thf! MNW &fl&'3QO 2007 wt\l¢h W!H ba Qctoht:r 31. 
ZIKlZ. 
5 envnmoo taes that sr.a ootnd 0o aggendwn #J nee 1° be ce(fucmd from $ 1? fiOQ oer month kl.----
az:m nae rnootb 
91/reA AHD Ru..eftAOStEE l'HAT TI-ff: CONTMCT Ol!ADt..9U::S rtEFER.aK;ED IN SEc;TU)N Zti ()F TH£ ~@~-
{CHe~ AP"'-.JCAc=L~ DOlQ: ( l A:EIAAIN UNCWANGED r J ~s c~~ AS f!OU..OWS: -
To Iha GQt\Vl11 8hiJ terr'n$ of 1h!s AODENPIJJuf ~ or conrnct witll .ar,y D't)Yi91ons of &oe R:EPC. lncloolrtg .>U pn01 ac,danoe--
3m:.1 i:;.ountoroffers, ther.t fl8n'M ~ 00~1. AU otllar ~rrtuJ ol Cha- RGPC, int:Jud~ all ptiof ~demtn antJ counteroftt.n;, 
not~ by'~ ~001:N DtJa8 Fqal\"eff1 me~- PQ SIKIW ( l ~ d'9ll hava UnUI ~ng ( J MS (Jt] ~ 
Mo\111 Time on ~~~~~~~ (Omta). to ao:rap\ ~ 'lemt~ ot tt\l$ AODEMOVM 1n ~(Jo-flea with the 
. u~ iOa~. ~~ml $Qt \'atftl ln lhls ADOSdl)UM &1'-ufl blpsa. 
fflSi2: 
p().ACCEPTAtiCe: (XJ SoHlor [ 1 ~ hltleby4«:wp~ U1lt terma Qf~ADl?.sNOUM. 
(l 1 COU [ J~ [ lllu;,,;:r-pnmentgas& th&tenmJ'Of ~ADtJSNOUM no._:__ 
~U - ~ , It 
~te) {Tlffl9l fl'lln6) 
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EXHIBIT 7 
-
STEVEN J. NEWMAN 
DIRECT DIAL: (801) 517-6878 
PERSONAL FAX: (801) 596-6878 
E-MAIL: NEWMANS@BALLARDSPAHR.COM 
March 5, 2009 
Via Federal Express and E-mail kkelly@rgn.com 
Keith A. Kelly, Esq. 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
PO Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ATLANTA, GA 
BALTIMORE, MD 
BETHESDA, MD 
DENVER, CO 
LAS VEGAS, NV 
LOS ANGELES, CA 
PHILADELPHIA, PA 
PHOENIX, AZ 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
VOORHEES, NJ 
WASHINGTON, DC 
WILMINGTON, DE 
Re: Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") between David and Jan Harrison 
("Seller") and New York Ave., LLC {"Buyer") 
Dear Mr. Kelly: 
My firm has been retained to represent the Seller in connection with the matter 
referenced above. Please advise the Buyer that the Seller: (i) is not willing to terminate the 
contract pursuant to the terms set forth in your letter to Seller dated February 17, 2009; and (ii) 
does not agree with your characterization of the facts concerning the REPC as set forth in your 
letter. 
After reviewing the REPC, we have determined that the Due Diligence Deadline 
has expired and, while the Buyer has the right to extend the Settlement Date by making an 
Extension Payment each month, the REPC is silent as to an outside Settlement Date and is 
therefore silent as to when Buyer's performance under the REPC must occur. It is unreasonable 
to interpret the extension provision in the REPC as allowing the Buyer to extend the Settlement 
indefinitely. It is well established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by which a 
certain act must be performed, law implies that the act must be done within a reasonable time 
under the circumstances. See Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 at 1242. It has been 
over 16 months since the original Settlement Deadline, Buyer has not closed on the purchase of 
the property, and any reasonable time for closing has already passed. 
We view Buyer's failure to close as a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Notwithstanding this breach, Seller is willing to close on or before August 
5, 2009. Otherwise, Seller reserves all of Seller's rights and remedies set forth in the REPC. 
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At your earliest convenience, please call me to discuss a reasonable Settlement 
Deadline. 
Very truly yours, 
Steven J. Newman 
SJN/sjn 
cc: David and Jan Harrison (via fax) 
Chris Anderson (via e-mail) 
· Steven Kelly (via fed-ex) 
DMWEST #6792353 v2 
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SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE 
PO Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0385 
36 South State Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
·,..:} 84111 
801 532-1500 m 
801 532-7543 FAX 
www.rqn.com 
PROVO OFFICE 
86 North University Ave. 
Suite 430 
·-d Provo, Utah 
84601-4420 
801 342-2400m 
801 375-8379 fAX 
.. i) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
August 31, 2009 
Via Hand-Delivery, Email & Tele/ax 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Jason D. Boren 
Steven J. Newman 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP 
Suite 800 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
Re: Real Estate Purchase Contract between 
David and Jan Harrison, and New York Ave., LLC 
Extension Payment for August of 2009 
Dear Mark, Jason & Steven: 
As you are aware, I represent New York Ave, LLC, regarding the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"), between your clients, David and 
Jan Harrison ("the Harrisons" or "Sellers"), and New York Ave, LLC ("my 
client'' or "Buyer"). Originally, your clients the Harrisons signed the REPC on 
November 10, 2006, and they signed addenda #1 and #2 on November 10, 2006 
and November 22, 2006, respectively. The REPC involved the sale of your 
clients' property located at approximately 950 W. and 700 S., Springville, UT, 
also known as parcel #26-041-0031, on November 10, 2006. This REPC is the 
subject of a lawsuit entitled New York Ave., LLC v. DavidD. & Jan. C. 
Harrison, Case No. 090402295 (Utah 4th D. Court) ("NYv. Harrison"). 
The REPC contains a clause with a due diligence period of90 days in 
which my client had the ability to cancel the REPC at its discretion. The REPC 
also contains a clause, paragraph 10 in Addendum No. 1, that allows my client 
to extend the settlement deadline at monthly increments by paying an 
"additional amount of non-refundable earnest money" ("Extension 
Payment(s)") that would "be a credit towards the purchase price at closing." 
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As you lmow, during the due diligence period, my client learned that the 
city sewer was not available to service this property, thus making development 
of this property not economically feasible at the time at the current purchase 
price. It was possible that development would not be economically feasable for 
a number of years at the current purchase price. Therefore, prior to the end of 
the 90 day due diligence period, the REPC was renegotiated as memorialized in 
Addendum No. 2, dated November 22, 2006. At the time of the signing of 
addendum #2, my client made your clients aware that the sewer was not 
available to the property as originally anticipated. Therefore, the contract was 
amended due to the fact that the property could not be developed as originally 
anticipated. 
Addendum No. 2, among other things, extended the settlement deadline 
to October 31, 2007, included 20.27 water shares in the sale, and reduced the 
monthly Extension Payment from $12,500 to $6,250, based on the 
understanding that it could take several years before this deal could be closed. 
This amendment was also based upon my client's understanding that: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
The purchase price for the property was .based on the 
assumption that it could be developed as single family 
residential that would maximize the development potential of 
the land based on the zoning laws in place that govern the 
subject property. With the lack of sewer capabilities, and 
through further information garnered through the 
development process that showed insufficient storm drainage 
capacity, the property could not (at the time) be developed to 
its maximum potential. 
The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could 
be developed to its maximum potential was crucial to my 
clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a credit 
towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the 
REPC and was in no way to be considered "rent,, or an 
interest payment. 
The closing deadline was being extended and Extension 
Payment reduced in part to account for the fact that, since the 
sewer was not readily available, it might be some time before 
the property could be developed as anticipated. 
The REPC could be extended, at my client's discretion as 
stated in the REPC, to allow for the property to be developed 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Jason D. Boren 
Steven J. Newman 
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to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to: ~ewer 
line extension installed to the property, storm drainage 
readily available, and property being economically feasible to 
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville city and 
existing market conditions. 
My client has deposited $6,250 with First American Title Company on 
or before the last day of each and every month since the settlement deadline 
noted in Addendum No. 2, thereby extending the settlement deadline every 
month since that settlement deadline. You have denied this point, apparently 
claiming each such payment has not been made. This denial is found in 
paragraph 19 of your Answer ("Answer") filed in NY v. Harrison. 
My client has performed and is continuing to perform under the parties' 
REPC. Accordingly, my client hereby provides you with the $6,250 August 
2009 Extension Payment. We invite you to carefully discuss with your clients 
what they understood was the purpose of Amendment No. 2 to the REPC. fu 
negotiating this $6,250 check, you are agreeing with my client that it is entitled 
under the REPC to make these payments in order to postpone closing in 
accordance with the express terms of the REPC until it is economically feasible 
to move forward with a residential development of the property as discussed 
above, including in paragraphs {a) through (d). My client is simply seeking the 
benefit of its bargain under the REPC, and nothing more - in light of your 
claims that my client may not now close under the REPC. Nothing in this letter 
should be construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or benefits other 
than those provided under the REPC. 
I look forward to discussing this matter with you further in an attempt to 
resolve your clients' concerns. Nothing herein constitutes a waiver or election 
of any remedies or rights by my client. 
Sincerely, 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. K~en 
Attorneys for Buyer New York Ave, LLC 
1049491 
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LAW OF'FICES 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
ONE UTAH CENTER. SUITE aoo 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2221 
801-531-3000 
FAX: BOl-531-3001 
WWW.BALLARDSPAHR.COM 
JASON O. BOREN 
DIRECT DIAL: 80Hll7·6827 
PERSONAL F"AX: 801·596·8827 
BORENJOBALLARDSPAHR.COM 
September 2, 2009 
-VIA FACSIMILE AND HAND DELIVERY 
Keith A. Kelly, Esq. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 S State Street # 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Keith: 
Re: New York Ave, L.L.C. v. David and Jan Harrison 
Civil No. 090402295 
PHILADELPHIA, PA 
BALTIMORE, MO 
BETHESDA, MO 
DENVER,CO 
LAS VEGAS, NV 
LOS ANGELES, CA 
PHOENIX, AZ 
VOORHEES, NJ 
WASHINGTON, OC 
WILMINGTON, OE 
We are in receipt of your letter dated August 31, 2009, in the above-referenced matter. 
Like your previous correspondence, your letter attempts to insert conditions and other terms 
which are not part of the Real Estate Purchase Contract between New York Ave, LLC and David 
and Jan Harrison. 
Contrary to your assertions, the contract was not amended due to the alleged 
unavailability of the sewer. If your client was not satisfied with what it discovered during the 
due diligence period, the Real Estate Purchase Contract provided for specific procedures to 
address such concerns. Your client failed to provide any written objections pursuant to the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract and cannot now claim that it was dissatisfied with what it discovered in 
the due diligence period. 
Despite your client's claims that it cannot develop the property as originally anticipated, 
it has done nothing, to our knowledge, to obtain sewer, or any other development rights or other 
entitlements that may affect development of the property. Your client cannot sit idly by and wait 
for someone else to accomplish what is solely within its ability and control. To do so constitutes 
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Moreover, your client's unexpressed intentions and "understanding" are simply irrelevant 
to the express language of the Real Estate Purchase Contract. See Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. 
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Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1983) ("It is well established in the law that unexpressed 
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract").-
In short, your attempt to modify the terms of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and to 
make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon your client's unilateral and 
unexpressed intentions and "understanding" is not only inappropriate, but constitutes a further 
breach of the parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract. See Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653 (Utah 
App. 1997) (valid tender requires buyer to make bona fide unconditional offer of payment). 
Accordingly, we enclose and return the check that you hand delivered to our offices. Please be 
advised that we will continue to accept the monthly checks so long as you withdraw your 
inappropriate conditions. 
By reason of your inappropriate and conditional tender of these monies, my clients intend 
to amend their counterclaim to assert a claim for your client's latest breach. Please notify me by 
the end of the week whether you will stipulate to allow the Harrisons to amend their 
counterclaim. In the event you refuse to do so, we will file a motion to amend with the Court. 
We look forward to your response. 
Additionally, as you know, it has always been our position that the transaction should be 
closed within a reasonable time. See Bradfordv. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (It is well 
established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by which a certain act must be 
perfonned, the law implies that the act must be done within a reasonable time). We have always 
been willing to discuss and negotiate a reasonable closing date. You have rejected our offers and 
attempts. We continue to be willing to discuss this matter. However, we believe the ball is in 
your court. Please let me know if you have any interest in discussing this matter further. 
JDB/ldi 
Enclosure 
cc: Mark R. Gaylord, Esq. 
Steven J. Newman, Esq. 
Michael D. Mayfield, Esq. 
Mr. David Harrison 
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